Amazon's Statement: Core Systems and Customer Data Remain Secure
Amazon has publicly stated that the company's main systems, AWS infrastructure, and customer-facing services experienced no security compromise related to the Snowflake-connected incident.[1][3]
Managed AWS Cloud Services India | AWS Consulting Partner India
In a formal statement to media outlets, an Amazon spokesperson clarified the scope and impact of the third-party breach:[1][3]
Official Statement:
"Amazon and AWS remain secure, and we have not experienced a security event. We were notified of a security event at one of our property management vendors that impacted several of its customers, including Amazon. The information impacted was employee contact information such as email addresses, desk phone numbers, and office locations."[1]
Key Takeaways from Amazon's Response:
· No Amazon System Compromise: Amazon's internal infrastructure, AWS cloud services, and retail platforms remain fully operational and secure[3][1]
· Limited Data Exposure: Only Amazon employee contact information (names, email addresses, phone numbers, office locations) was exposed through the third-party vendor[1]
· No Customer Impact: Customer accounts, payment information, order history, and AWS tenant data were not affected[3][1]
· Vendor-Side Issue: The breach occurred on the vendor's systems, not Amazon's environment, establishing a clear distinction between first-party and third-party risk[1]
Why This Matters for Amazon Customers
Amazon customers do not need to take immediate action regarding this particular incident:[1]
· No password resets required
· No account monitoring necessary
· No payment or transaction data at risk
· AWS services remain fully operational
· Customer data integrity uncompromised
However, this incident demonstrates the increasing importance of vendor risk management and third-party security oversight in enterprise environments.[6][1]
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The Broader Snowflake Breach Campaign: UNC5537 and 165+ Affected Organizations
The Amazon incident occurred within the context of a much larger, ongoing Snowflake-focused cyberattack campaign orchestrated by financially motivated threat actor UNC5537, affecting over 165 organizations globally.[2][3][5][7]
How does Snowflake work? Explore its architecture and components
Understanding the Snowflake Breach Timeline
The Snowflake security crisis unfolded across multiple phases in 2024-2025:[2][3][4][5][7]
|
Timeline |
Event |
Impact |
|
May 2024 |
Mandiant receives intelligence on Snowflake customer data exfiltration |
First confirmed compromise detected |
|
May 22, 2024 |
Mandiant identifies broader campaign targeting multiple Snowflake instances |
UNC5537 campaign scope clarified |
|
June 2024 |
Public disclosure of breaches affecting Ticketmaster, LendingTree, and others |
Major customers exposed |
|
July 2024 |
AT&T confirms data breach linked to Snowflake incident |
Largest-profile victim announced |
|
2025 |
Ongoing extortion attempts and credential exploitation |
Campaign continues evolution |
Mandiant, owned by Google Cloud, identified UNC5537 as the primary threat actor behind the systematic Snowflake compromise campaign:[3][5][7]
Threat Actor Profile:
· Designation: UNC5537 (also known as "Scattered Spider" and "ShinyHunters")
· Motivation: Financial gain through data theft and extortion
· Operating Geography: International operations with infrastructure in Moldova and other countries
· Activity Pattern: Systematically targets organizations with weak credential security and missing MFA
· Extortion Method: Threatens to sell stolen data on cybercrime forums and demands ransom payments
· Access Infrastructure: Uses Mullvad and Private Internet Access (PIA) VPN services to mask IP addresses; leverages MEGA cloud storage for stolen data staging
Arrogant Claims:
Threat actor "Nam3L3ss" (linked to broader campaign operations) claimed possession of:
· Over 250TB of archived databases
· Data from 25+ major firms
· Threatened release of information from as many as 1,000 previously undisclosed breaches[1]
How UNC5537 Gained Access: The Credential Theft Method
Unlike traditional software vulnerabilities, UNC5537 exploited a fundamental security control gap: the absence of multi-factor authentication on Snowflake customer accounts.[2][3][5][7]
Attack Methodology:
1. Credential Harvesting: UNC5537 obtained Snowflake customer credentials through multiple infostealer malware variants, including:
o VIDAR
o RISEPRO
o REDLINE
o RACOON STEALER
o LUMMA
o METASTEALER
2. Credential Aggregation: Threat actors purchased or accessed stolen credential lists from the underground dark web infostealer economy
3. Account Access Without Authentication: Used stolen credentials (username and password only) to directly access Snowflake customer instances lacking MFA protection[5][7]
4. Data Exfiltration: Exported massive volumes of sensitive data including:
o Customer databases
o Financial records
o Personal identifiable information (PII)
o Proprietary business data
o Trade secrets
5. Extortion and Sale: Posted stolen data on cybercrime forums, threatened victims, and attempted to sell information to the highest bidder[3][5]
Mandiant's investigation identified the scope of UNC5537's successful operations:[3][5][7]
· Organizations Notified: Approximately 165 Snowflake customer environments potentially exposed[5][3]
· Victims with Exposed Credentials: 79.7% of attacked accounts had prior credential exposure via infostealer malware[7]
· Credential Rotation Status: Many affected accounts had not been rotated for 4+ years, compounding vulnerability[7]
· MFA Implementation Rate: Vast majority of compromised instances did NOT require multi-factor authentication[5][7]
· High-Profile Victims: Ticketmaster, Lenovo, HP, LendingTree, AT&T, McDonald's, and dozens of other major corporations[1][4][5]
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The Root Cause: MFA Gaps and Weak Credential Security
Security investigations by Mandiant and Snowflake identified three critical vulnerabilities that enabled UNC5537's systematic compromise:[3][5][7]
Back to basics: Multi-factor authentication (MFA) | NIST
Vulnerability #1: Lack of Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
The primary failure enabling the campaign was the widespread absence of MFA on Snowflake accounts:[3][5][7]
The MFA Problem:
· Snowflake did not mandate MFA for customer accounts prior to 2024
· Many customers failed to voluntarily implement MFA despite availability
· Even employees with access to production Snowflake instances accessed accounts using only username/password
· One Snowflake employee's own demo account, lacking MFA, was compromised through infostealer malware[8]
Why MFA Would Have Prevented Breaches:
Multi-factor authentication requires a second verification method (one-time code, biometric, security key) beyond just the password:
· Even with stolen username and password, attackers cannot access accounts
· Adds significant complexity to credential exploitation attacks
· Makes large-scale automated credential attacks infeasible
Industry Response:
Snowflake subsequently announced requirements for customers to implement MFA:
· New mandatory security controls required for all customer instances
· Enforcement timeline established for existing customers
· MFA now standard industry practice for cloud platforms[5][7]
Vulnerability #2: Inadequate Credential Rotation
Many compromised accounts had not rotated credentials for extended periods:[7]
Credential Rotation Gaps:
· Affected organizations had not rotated passwords/tokens for 4+ years
· No automated rotation policies implemented
· Credentials exposed via infostealer malware remained valid indefinitely
· Attackers exploited stale credentials with no indication of compromise
Best Practice Standard:
Modern security frameworks recommend:
· Password rotation every 90 days maximum
· Immediate rotation upon suspected compromise
· Automated rotation policies for service accounts and API keys
· Credential inventory and expiration tracking
Vulnerability #3: Missing Network Access Controls
Organizations failed to implement IP whitelisting and network allow lists:[7]
Access Control Failures:
· No restrictions limiting Snowflake access to trusted IP addresses/geographic locations
· Attackers accessed instances from international VPS providers without triggering alerts
· Off-hours access patterns not monitored or flagged
· Unusual data export volumes not reviewed or constrained
Proper Network Controls Include:
· IP whitelisting allowing access only from corporate networks
· Geographic restrictions blocking access from unexpected countries
· Anomaly detection flagging unusual access patterns
· Rate limiting on data exports
· Real-time alerting on suspicious activities
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Amazon's Vendor Relationship and Third-Party Risk
The Amazon incident highlights how large enterprises can inadvertently introduce security vulnerabilities through third-party vendors holding sensitive corporate data.[1][6]
VENDOR SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MGMT.
Why Vendors Become Attack Targets
Third-party vendors often represent attractive targets for sophisticated threat actors:[6]
Vendor Vulnerability Factors:
1. Lower Security Investment: Many vendors have smaller security budgets than major enterprise customers
2. Multiple Customer Data: Single vendor breach exposes data from many organizations simultaneously
3. Trust Relationships: Organizations often grant vendors broader data access than strictly necessary
4. Legacy Systems: Vendors frequently operate outdated infrastructure and systems
5. Limited Oversight: Customer organizations may inadequately monitor vendor security practices
The Supply Chain Risk Cascade:
When a vendor is compromised:
· Attackers gain trusted access credentials
· Multiple customers' data becomes exposed in single incident
· Detection becomes more difficult (incident appears to originate from trusted vendor)
· Remediation requires coordination across multiple organizations
· Regulatory exposure multiplies across affected companies
Amazon's Vendor Security Requirements
As a result of this incident, large organizations like Amazon must strengthen vendor security practices:[1][6]
Recommended Vendor Management Controls:
· Security Questionnaires: Regular assessments of vendor security practices and controls
· Audit Rights: Contract language allowing security audits of vendor systems
· MFA Requirements: Mandatory multi-factor authentication for all vendor systems
· Data Minimization: Limiting vendor access to only necessary employee/customer data
· Encryption Requirements: Mandating encryption of sensitive data at rest and in transit
· Breach Notification: Contractual requirements for rapid breach disclosure
· Incident Response Plans: Pre-negotiated response procedures and timelines
· Insurance Requirements: Vendor cybersecurity insurance providing financial protection
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Lessons Learned: Cloud Security Best Practices
The Snowflake and Amazon incidents underscore critical security priorities for cloud infrastructure and enterprise data protection.[9][10][11][12][4][6]
How To Create a Cybersecurity Incident Response Plan | Capterra
Large organizations must implement comprehensive cloud security strategies:[9][10][11][12][4][7]
Priority 1: Identity and Access Management
· Enforce MFA universally across all cloud platforms and internal systems
· Implement zero-trust access policies requiring continuous verification
· Monitor and revoke unused accounts and API credentials
· Enforce principle of least privilege limiting access to necessary data only
· Maintain detailed audit logs of all account access and changes
Priority 2: Data Protection Strategy
· Classify data by sensitivity level and apply corresponding protection controls
· Encrypt sensitive data at rest using strong encryption standards
· Encrypt data in transit using TLS/SSL protocols
· Implement data loss prevention (DLP) tools monitoring unusual exports
· Establish data retention policies limiting unnecessary historical data storage
Priority 3: Vendor Risk Management
· Maintain comprehensive inventory of all third-party vendors with data access
· Assess vendor security maturity and compliance certifications
· Require vendors to maintain specific security controls (MFA, encryption, auditing)
· Monitor vendor security incidents and threat intelligence
· Conduct periodic security audits or assessments of critical vendors
· Establish rapid incident notification requirements in contracts
Priority 4: Monitoring and Detection
· Enable comprehensive logging on all cloud platforms and systems
· Implement Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems
· Deploy anomaly detection identifying unusual access patterns or data exports
· Monitor for signs of credential compromise or unauthorized access
· Establish 24/7 security operations center (SOC) capabilities
· Conduct regular security assessments and penetration testing
Priority 5: Incident Response Preparedness
· Develop detailed incident response plans before breaches occur
· Establish clear communication procedures for various incident types
· Coordinate with law enforcement and regulatory bodies
· Maintain relationships with incident response firms (like Mandiant)
· Conduct regular tabletop exercises testing response procedures
· Prepare public disclosure statements and notification templates
For Individual Users and Employees
Even within organizations with strong security programs, individuals can strengthen personal security postures:[10][11][6]
Personal Security Measures:
1. Enable MFA Everywhere: Activate multi-factor authentication on all important accounts
o Email accounts (primary attack vector)
o Financial accounts (banking, investment services)
o Cloud platforms (Google Drive, OneDrive, Dropbox)
o Work accounts (VPN, email, cloud systems)
o Social media and personal accounts
2. Use Strong, Unique Passwords:
o Minimum 16-20 character passwords with mixed character types
o Never reuse passwords across different services
o Use password managers to securely store complex passwords
o Avoid password hints or security questions with publicly available answers
3. Monitor for Credential Exposure:
o Use services like HaveIBeenPwned.com to check for exposed credentials
o Subscribe to breach notification services
o Set up Google Alerts for personal information exposure
o Monitor credit reports annually for identity theft signs
4. Recognize Social Engineering Attacks:
o Scrutinize emails requesting sensitive information or account verification
o Verify sender identity through independent channels (phone calls, official websites)
o Avoid clicking links in unexpected emails or messages
o Report suspected phishing attempts to IT security teams
5. Practice Device Security:
o Keep operating systems and software updated with security patches
o Run reputable antivirus and anti-malware software
o Disable unnecessary browser extensions and plug-ins
o Use VPNs on untrusted networks (public WiFi)
o Lock devices when unattended and use biometric authentication
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Snowflake's Response: Remediation and Future Security Enhancements
Following the breach disclosure, Snowflake implemented substantial security improvements and worked with customers to strengthen their defensive postures.[3][5][7]
Snowflake's incident response timeline:[3][5][7]
· Contacted Customers: Direct engagement with all potentially affected organizations
· Provided Remediation Guidance: Specific steps for securing compromised instances
· Coordinated Investigation: Worked with Mandiant to identify breach scope and attack vectors
· Established Support Program: Created specialized support team for affected customers
· Threat Intelligence Sharing: Provided indicators of compromise and attacker infrastructure details
Longer-Term Security Improvements
Snowflake announced enhanced security requirements for all customers:[5][7]
Mandatory Security Controls:
· Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Required for all account types and access methods
· Network Policies: Implementation of IP-based access controls and geographic restrictions
· Advanced Authentication: Support for SAML-based single sign-on (SSO) and stronger identity controls
· Enhanced Logging: Improved audit logging and query history capabilities
· API Security: Updated API authentication mechanisms and token management
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What Organizations Should Do Now: Action Items
For enterprise organizations concerned about Snowflake or general cloud security:[6]
1. Inventory Snowflake Usage: Document all Snowflake instances across the organization
2. Verify MFA Deployment: Confirm MFA is enabled on all Snowflake accounts
3. Audit Access Credentials: Review account credentials for age and rotation history
4. Enable Detailed Logging: Activate comprehensive audit logging in Snowflake
5. Check for Suspicious Activity: Review access logs for unusual patterns or unauthorized access
Short-Term Actions (Weeks 1-4)
1. Rotate All Credentials: Change passwords for all Snowflake accounts, especially inactive ones
2. Implement Network Policies: Enable IP whitelisting and geographic access restrictions
3. Review Access Rights: Audit and minimize data access for all user accounts
4. Vendor Risk Assessment: Evaluate security practices of all third-party vendors with data access
5. Employee Awareness: Train staff on credential security, phishing recognition, and incident reporting
Long-Term Actions (Months 2-6)
1. Comprehensive Security Audit: Engage third-party security firm to assess cloud security posture
2. Incident Response Planning: Develop detailed cloud breach response procedures
3. Continuous Monitoring: Implement automated anomaly detection and security analytics
4. Vendor Contracts: Update agreements to require security controls and incident notification
5. Regulatory Compliance: Ensure compliance with industry regulations (SOC 2, ISO 27001, HIPAA, etc.)
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Conclusion: Third-Party Risk Is Everyone's Risk
Amazon's statement that core systems remain secure provides reassurance to customers, but the incident underscores a fundamental reality of modern enterprise security: organizations are only as secure as their weakest vendor.[1][3][6]
The Snowflake campaign affecting 165+ organizations demonstrates how rapidly security incidents can cascade through interconnected business ecosystems. Simple security controls—particularly multi-factor authentication, credential rotation, and network access policies—would have prevented the vast majority of UNC5537's successful compromises.
Key Takeaways:
1. MFA Is Essential: Multi-factor authentication should be mandatory, not optional, for all cloud services
2. Vendor Risk Is Real: Third-party vendors with data access require active security management and oversight
3. Credential Hygiene Matters: Regular password rotation and monitoring for compromised credentials directly prevents breaches
4. Assume Breach Mentality: Organizations should operate under the assumption that breaches will occur and design defenses accordingly
5. Transparency Builds Trust: Amazon's clear communication about the limited scope and immediate corrective actions demonstrates appropriate incident response
The cloud security landscape continues evolving as threat actors become increasingly sophisticated. Organizations that prioritize identity security, continuous monitoring, and vendor risk management will weather security incidents far more effectively than those neglecting these fundamentals.
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